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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and the value of 115 Canadian companies for the period of 2005-2010, 
using such indicator as corporate governance index (CGI) . This index includes four 
sub-indices: board composition (BC), compensation policies (C), shareholders rights 
(SR), and disclosure policies (D). The index is based primarily on values given by the 
Globe and Mail 's Report on Business (ROB) from various years and various 
measures of firms ' performance. It also compares various profitability indicators and 
other parameters obtained from balance sheets, income statements and financial data 
from the OSIRIS database and S&P Capital IQ, among others. Overall, this study 
does not fmd a relationship between corporate governance and the various measures 
of a firm ' s value. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of corporate governance is a matter of considerable debate 
worldwide by academics, regulators, executives and investors. The episodes 
involving Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, Satyam, and others have pointed to the failures of 
corporate governance due to how it has finally led to the demise of these firms . Some 
of the episodes of inappropriate corporate governance failures indicate fraudulent 
accounting methods, tunnelling, asset stripping, overpaying executives and abuses of 
stock options. In the US, the corporate scandals led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 and to various amendments to US stock-exchange regulators. 
"Corporate governance" refers to mechanisms that are put in place for what is 
commonly called as the "agency problem": the process by which shareholders 
(owners) and creditors (those who lend money) of the firm in getting a return on their 
investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This process also includes managers (who 
control the firm), lenders and other stakeholders (unions, societies, etc.). If better 
governance means that investors' funds are used for the purposes of productivity, 
then that would result in a better financial outcome. 
Prior studies indicate that corporate governance is important to shareholders ' 
value (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007). Previous studies on corporate governance have 
highlight the board of directors, executive compensation, and the relation to owners 
and takeover defenses. The empirical literature on the impact of corporate governance 
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on firm performance is divergent. Studies conducted by Black (2001), Dedman 
(2002), Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) have found a positive correlation between 
corporate governance and performance. On the other hand, studies led by Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick (2003), Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong (2005), and Ferreira 
and Laux (2007) find a weak correlation between governance and firm performance. 
In Canada, a study by Klein et al (2005) finds that corporate governance does matter 
in the fmancial outcome. However, the empirical results are generally mixed. Given 
the divergent results, the present study examines the impact of corporate governance 
variables on the fmancial outcome of 115 Canadian firms for the period 2005 to 2010 
using the corporate governance index (CGI) and comparing aspects of governance 
such as board composition, shareholders and compensation policies, and shareholder 
rights policies and disclosure policies, as well as numerous performance indicators 
such as ROA, ROE and Tobin's q, among others. It will also consider financial data 
for six years instead of just one year. Inference will be developed by looking at 
descriptive statistics in order to determine whether corporate governance plays an 
important role in company success. 
The study is organised as follows: Chapter II presents a review of literature. 
Chapter III describes the database and methodology used in the study. Chapter IV 
presents the empirical results. Chapter V presents concluding observations. 
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Chapter II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been a considerable amount of research done on corporate 
governance and firm performance around the world. In this chapter, we briefly review 
the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of corporate governance on 
company financial performance. This chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 
discusses the corporate governance concept. Section 2 rev1ews the relationship 
between board composition and company performance. Section 3 exammes the 
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. Section 4 
reviews the shareholders ' rights policies. Section 5 reviews the empirical literature on 
various indicators of corporate governance and firm performance. Section 6 records 
the conclusions of this chapter. 
I. Corporate governance definition. 
Trying to define corporate governance is a challenge because it is a subject 
that is difficult to quantify; despite this fact, Charkham ( 1991) describes corporate 
governance as "the system by which companies are run." 
Numerous studies have tried to use different theories to define corporate 
governance-the manager-oriented theory that originates in the USA, the labor-
oriented theory embraced by Germany, the state-oriented theory adopted by France 
and many countries in Asia (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2000)-but they have failed to 
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leave space for the agency model where the CEO is considered the head of the 
managers. For that reason, it has been necessary to have a strong independent board 
that fulfills the governance functions (Murphy, 1985). 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) say that "corporate 
governance is a set of mechanisms by which the outside shareholders protect 
themselves against the managers and controlling shareholders"; in the same sense, 
Cadbury (2003) defines corporate governance as the process by which individual 
corporations are managed and controlled (Claessens, International Finance 
Corporation, 2003). 
The corporations have CEOs and directors that create strategies and policies 
to achieve their goals: profits without the need to invest, leading to the 
shareholders-the true owners-being able to enjoy those profits without 
participating in the company' s operations. The relationship derived from these 
activities is what corporate governance study includes (Monks & Minow, 1995). 
Cadbury disagrees with this assertion, since he considers shareholders to have three 
core rights or duties: to appoint the directors, to appoint the auditors, and to assure 
that the company has effective corporate governance (Naciri, 2008). Therefore, the 
shareholders do participate in the company' s operations. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), in early studies, point out that the firm ' s goal is 
to maximize its value; however, the members may have different objectives, and the 
alignment between them should be a priority in order to have positive results. Making 
4 
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the right decisions develops a good reputation, making more attractive the company 
for future investors and reducing the agency cost. However, at some point, the new 
members will lose interest in pursuing the company' s goals and find it more 
important to pursue their own interest (Jensen & Murphy, CEO incentives-it's not 
how much you pay, but how, 1990). 
According to other studies, corporate governance is the process where 
investors attempt to guarantee for themselves a return on their investment; therefore, 
the corporate manager should make decisions that consider the interests of 
shareholders, whether those shareholders have the right to vote or not (Foerster & 
Huen, 2004); (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000); (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance addresses the issues whereby principle 
shareholders are the owners of the company, and they want to ensure that the 
managers act in the best interests of that principle (Foerster & Huen, 2004). 
According to Rezaee (2004), the main purpose of corporate governance is to 
minimize the conflicts between managers and shareholders through auditors who 
should monitor the quality of the fmancial reporting process. Corporate governance 
helps to improve the efficiency and quality of financial reporting, and it is based on 
the managers ' accountability to the board of directors, as well as on the responsibility 
that the board of directors has to align the interests of managers, directors, and 
stakeholders (Rezaee, 2004). 
5 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRMS ' VALUE IN CANADA 2005-2010 
Corporate governance depends upon regulatory-level and firm-level 
mechanisms, which are set in place to ensure appropriate governance standards. 
Regulatory-level governance mechanisms include a country' s laws, its culture and its 
norms (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997); therefore, governments have created more specific 
regulations for the people involved with the corporations; Canada has made 
numerous contributions in this matter, and the most important are: (1) the Dey 
Report, which was inspired by reports from the UK and USA and which introduced 
guidelines for board responsibilities for strategy and risk, independence, evaluation 
and disclosure, and those basic capabilities that any board should focus on; (2) the 
Saucer Report, inspired again by the UK and USA reports, this time including 
organizations such as the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and the Canadian Institute 
of Chartered Accountants (CICA); and (3) the Canadian Security Administrators 
(CSA), who created a series of National Instruments, which covered divergent 
aspects of corporate governance such as independence of all members of the board, 
audit committees and compensations committees, and disclosure of accounting 
reports and stock-option plans (Naciri, 2008). 
When investors finance a company, they generally gain certain rights and 
powers that are protected through regulations and laws such as accounting and 
disclosure rules (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000); (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). However, those regulations do not have influence on the internal 
policies of the corporations; therefore, they do not guarantee improvement in the 
efficiency of corporate governance. Firm-level mechanisms are internal to the 
company, and these internally regulating mechanisms are heavily influenced by a 
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firm ' s charter, regulations and policies (Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, & Rohan, 2007). For 
that reason, many studies have tried to identify aspects that are important in good 
corporate governance and to discover whether those are related to corporate 
performance. 
Many studies focus on the relationship between corporate governance and a 
firm's value, but some recent studies examine if corporate governance can be 
measured and if the resulting score is related to good corporate performance. 
Companies such as Standards and Poor's Rating Services (S&P) state that the 
measurements of corporate governance are key to a company' s performance; 
therefore, its criteria include "all fundamental quantitative and qualitative elements, 
analytical methodologies, and assumptions that" its employees "use in the ratings 
process to produce" their opinions (The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2009). This 
institution takes into consideration factors such as board structure, ownership and 
shareholder rights, location (global, regional or local), and industry, and it also takes 
note of all types of qualitative or quantitative assumptions, which cause it to arrive at 
a certain rating opinion. 
Governance Metrics International (GMI) is an independent corporate 
governance research and rating agency that rates companies based on their inclusion 
in a market index followed by the MSCI EAFE index, Russell 1000 or S&P 500 
Index, among others. This company gives corporate governance rating services on 
three levels: by geographic region (e.g., companies rated by GMI in North America, 
Europe or the Asia-Pacific region), by market sector or industry group (e.g. , health 
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care) and, for smaller institutions, through customized portfolio coverage. It has 
found a consistent relationship between governance and performance and has pointed 
out governance weaknesses before events unfolded publicly at a number of high-
profile companies (GMI). 
Also, the Globe and Mail's Report on Business (ROB) is another source that 
provides analysis by sector (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, finance services; 
etc.), region (Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America; etc.), and exchange (Abu Dhabi 
Securities Market, Amman Stock Exchange, Barcelona Stock Exchange, Chicago 
Board of Trade Electronic; etc.). It is believed that the corporate governance index is 
related to corporate performance. The corporate governance index published by this 
company is the one used in the present study. 
II. Board composition and company performance. 
The main purpose of corporate governance resides in minimizing the conflicts 
between managers and shareholders through auditors who monitor the quality of the 
financial reporting process. Corporate governance helps to improve the efficiency and 
quality of financial reporting; this governance is based on the managers' 
accountability to the board of directors and on the responsibility of that board to align 
the interests among managers, directors, and stakeholders (Rezaee, 2004); (Hermalin 
& Weisbach, The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm 
performance, 1991 ). The literature reviewed has shown the relationship between 
shareholders, the board of directors and top management. The board composition of a 
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business may vary depending on different elements such as the percentage of the 
directors, audit committees, compensation committees and nominating committees 
that are independent, and the size of the board; the separation between the chair and 
CEO roles; the CEO's commitments outside the firm with other boards; the frequency 
of the meetings; etc. In the following paragraphs, this study briefly reviews some of 
aspects of the board of directors. 
Board size. 
The literature indicates that the s1ze of the board is important for the 
performance of a company, a strategic factor that can influence the structure and 
performance of the organization. Some studies support the idea that when the size of 
the board is bigger, it becomes more difficult to monitor, making management a 
problem due to a large board (Jensen M. C., The modem industrial revolution, exit 
and the failure of internal control systems., 1993). The boardrooms are dysfunctional 
places where the directors rarely discuss firm performance or any of the policies 
implemented by the top managers (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). 
The size of the board should not be equal for all firms. Researchers who have 
studied this issue have come to various (sometimes contradictory) conclusions. Some 
support the idea that when a board gets beyond seven or eight people, it is less likely 
to function effectively and will be controlled and manipulated by the CEO much 
more easily (Jensen M. C., The modem industrial revolution, exit and the failure of 
internal control systems. , 1993); others maintain that the size of the board should be 
9 
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ten members, with eight or nme being the ideal (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). The 
Cadbury committee (Cadbury Committee, 1992) recommends eight to ten members 
maximum as an ideal size of the board. 
According to Monk and Minow (1995), the size of the board does matter, as it 
influences monitoring, controlling and decision making in the firm. Small boards are 
said to help in alleviating the effort problem and in becoming more effective (Jensen 
M. C., The modem industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control 
systems., 1993); (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992); however, when small firms grow too big, 
boards become more symbolic rather than being a part of the management process 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, Boards of directors as an endogenously determined 
institution: a survey of economic literature, 2003). 
In opposition, some studies support the idea that bigger boards provide 
diversity that would help compames to secure critical resources and reduce 
environmental uncertainties ; board size is related to the firm's environmental needs 
(Pfeffer, 1972). He says "that board size and composition are not random or 
independent factors, but are, rather, rational organizational responses to the 
conditions of the external environment" (Pfeffer, 1972). Sanders and Carpenter 
(1998) support the idea that the size of the board is related to the level of necessity of 
the company; the firm ' s internalization is complex, and this fact has to be reflected in 
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Core, et al. (1999), using a large sample of US data, finds no association 
between board size and firm financial performance; in contrast, Y ermack (1996) finds 
a significant negative relation between the two of them based on Tobin ' s q. A study 
that draws on a large sample of firms from 52 countries to investigate the relationship 
between firm performance and the number of directors finds that there is a positive 
relationship between past performance and changes in the number of directors 
(Heaney, et al. , 2005); however, many scholars support the idea that board 
composition and size are related to the strategy of the company and its external 
environment (Pearce & Zahra, 1992). 
Board composition. 
The board composition 1s another strategic element m the corporate 
governance of internal organization. Today, corporations take into consideration 
many factors such as independence, gender, nationality, efficiency, and professional 
background; independence is determined by the number of inside and outside 
members. The board of directors is one of the important institutions of internal 
control; it provides governance safeguards (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Various 
researchers have different opinion about the number of outside and inside directors a 
company should have. The independent directors do not necessarily transform into 
better performance, since the inside director can contribute more with valuable 
information about the company' s long-term decisions. According to Klein (1998), 
there is a positive relationship between firm 's financial performance and the inside 
11 
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directors, especially if they serve on fmance and investment committees, since the 
firm ' s accounting and market value will consequently improve (Klein A., 1998). 
The different regulatory reg1mes m Canada and the United States have 
resulted in considerably different corporate governance practices. Canadian 
companies have smaller boards with few independent directors; the boards meet more 
frequently; their directors sit on a greater number of boards, are less likely to have a 
CEO also serving as chair of the board, and are less likely to have compensation. As 
well, the fraction of independent directors sitting on nominating and corporate 
governance committees is significantly lower. (Broshko & Li, 2006) 
Canadian corporate governance follows the Anglo-American model; however, 
it is different from the US and UK structures of corporate ownership. According to 
Klein, Shapiro and Young "most Canadian companies are family owned, controlled 
by a principal shareholder" (Monks & Minow, 1995); (Klein, Shapiro, & Young, 
2005). This structure is reflected in the board 's composition and the fact that the 
majority of inside directors keep a strong influence on decision making. Therefore, 
the minority of shareholders are becoming more active (Monks & Minow, 1995). 
To determine the relationship of corporate governance and performance, most 
Canadian studies concentrate on the board's independence or on the separation of 
CEO and chair; actually, however, it is more important to consider the process of how 
the boards work and make decisions . According to Leblanc and Gillies "improving 
process will not only improve board governance but will also prove that there really 
12 
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is a link between a board of directors and a firm's financial performance." (Leblanc & 
Gillies, 2003) 
Other studies consider board independence to have a negative effect on the 
markets. Considering recent scandals, it seems a better alternative to have inside 
directors who do not misallocate the company' s resources (Bhagat & Bolton, 
Corporate governance and firm performance, 2008). According to Bhagat and Black 
(1999), there is a negative correlation between the proportion of independent 
directors and firm performance; the independence can overwhelm the company with 
excessive monitoring (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990) due to a lack of business 
knowledge, resulting in poor performance. Dahya, et al. (1996), Steward (1991), and 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) support the idea that effective performance can be 
achieved by reinforcing the manager' s control and responsibilities. As per Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006), the non-executive directors or outsiders reduce the agency 
conflicts associated with the potential mismanagement of the company's resources; 
however, they do not have the capacity to monitor the board ' s activities due to a lack 
of knowledge of their responsibilities. Therefore, this characteristic does not 
necessarily reflect improvement in the firm 's performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
Also, Prevost, Rao and Hossain (2002) find that firm performance and board 
composition have a positive correlated influence on each other, since a firm's 
performance can be impacted by the composition of the board, and the composition 
of the board can be impacted by the performance of the company (Prevost, Rao, & 
Hossain, 2002). 
13 
CORPORATE GOVERNA N CE A ND FIRMS ' VALUE IN CANADA 2005-2010 
According to the study by Erickson, Parka, Hyun, and Shin (2005), boards 
with more independence do not have a positive impact on firm performance, 
especially in the presence of significant ownership concentration such as in Canadian 
companies. Similarly, Dalton, Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999) and Bhagat and Black 
(2000) did not find any relationship between independence of the board and firm 
performance using performance indicators (accounting or market return) and "board 
composition" measured in terms of whether it is outside, interdependent, or affiliated. 
Dahya and McConnell (2003) examined UK companies over 1989-1996 and found 
that the companies that followed the Cadbury recommendation (which mandates at 
least three outside directors for publicly-traded corporations) improved their 
operating performance significantly. 
III. Executive compensation and firm performance. 
In Canada, many of the largest firms are legally controlled by individuals, 
families or private holdings companies (Rao & Lee-Sing, 1996); for this reason, it has 
been necessary to establish independent mechanisms of control and monitoring, 
causing increase of payment to top executives for their performance. The level of 
compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) has been a topic of considerable 
controversy in the academic and business world. Core, Holthausen and Larcker 
(1999) argue that the board of directors is subjected to the CEO's decisions, and 
consequently, it does not structure the CEO's compensation package to maximize the 
profit for the shareholders (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999). 
14 
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The shareholders ' pressure has helped to control executive pay in Canada 
(McFarland, 2010); in the academic and business worlds, there is an extensive 
discussion about executive compensation, but it is not clear yet what kind of structure 
such compensation should have if it is to solve the agency problem and the 
performance of the company. Linking corporate performance and executive 
compensation policies can align the interests of the manager and shareholders 
(Murphy, 1985). In their study, Jensen and Murphy (1990) describe the problem of 
CEOs behaving according to compensation; if they are paid as bureaucrats, they will 
behave as bureaucrats. The solution is to pay CEOs more equity-based compensation 
as opposed to cash compensation, as it provides managers with the correct incentive 
to maximize firm value (Jensen & Murphy, CEO incentives-it's not how much you 
pay, but how, 1990). Contrarily, Mehran (1995) argues that there is little evidence on 
whether corporations whose executive compensation is more equity-based have better 
performance; he finds that both Tobin ' s q and ROA are positively related to the 
percentage of executives' total compensation that is equity-based as well as the 
percentage of shares owned by top managers. This finding suggests that executive 
compensation has a positive impact in the managers ' performance and prompts them 
to become more efficient and effective (Mehran, 1995). 
Klein (1998) argues that the structure of the boards (the inside directors on 
finance and investment committees) and the firm performance are significantly 
related; board characteristics and ownership structures have a substantive cross-
sectional association with the level of CEO compensation (Klein A. , 1998). Basu, 
Hwang, Mitsudome, and Weintrop (2007) examine 174 Japanese corporations, 
15 
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finding that corporate governance with weak structures have more agency problems, 
paying more to their CEOs and having a poor performance; therefore, the greater 
stock ownership by the board is associated with the higher income of the top 
executive (Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome, & Weintrop, 2007). Despite the extensive 
studies about corporate governance and its relationship with corporate governance, 
the results are contradictory, which makes it necessary to analyse more closely the 
influence that corporate governance has over firm performance. 
IV. Shareholders' rights policies. 
Public comparues are characterized by the separation of ownership and 
control. The shareholders delegate the decisions (control) to corporate managers; 
however, the most effective way to control managers ' behaviour is by giving them 
the right to vote on the major issues. The same policy works as regards the 
shareholder' s equity stake in the firm (Gry, 2005). 
According to Jiraporn (2006), companies where shareholders' rights are weak 
tend to repurchase less stock due to the managers ' ability to identify this weakness 
and retain more cash within the company. On the contrary, companies with strong 
shareholders' rights force managers to expel cash to stockholders in the form of 
repurchases. The companies where shareholders ' rights are weak are more likely to 
be industrially diversified due to the exploitation of shareholders by the managers and 
the unwise diversification of the company. As a result, industrially diversified firms 
exhibit a reduction in value. Companies with better corporate governance practices 
16 
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tend to respect shareholders ' rights much more than comparues with weaker 
corporate governance practices (Jiraporn, Share repurchases, shareholder rights, and 
corporate governance provisions, 2006). 
Claessens (2003) argues that in Asian countries, there is a negative association 
with the separation of ownership, voting rights and the performance of the company; 
it is also evident that countries with poor protection for investors have low 
performance, and countries with high protection for investors have better 
performance (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). 
La Porta Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) state that there is 
evidence of higher firm valuations in countries where better protection is provided for 
minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the 
controlling shareholder. In their empirical research, they explain the consequences of 
corporate ownership for corporate valuation in different legal regimes, and it is 
empirically demonstrated that poor shareholder protection is penalized with lower 
valuations and that higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder 
improves valuation, particularly in countries with poor track records of investor 
protection (La porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). 
V. Indicators of corporate governance and firm performance. 
A substantial number of studies have attempted to identify elements of 
corporate governance that are related to firm value; several have been conducted to 
17 
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examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, but 
the results have not been unanimous because different elements have been taken into ···. 
consideration. The question in corporate governance is what mechanism leads to an 
increase in the company's value; is it "the legal protection of capitalists, the firm's 
competitive environment, its ownership structure, board composition, [or] financial 
policy?" (Bocean & Barbu, 2012). Various corporate governance provisions affect 
the outcome of corporate performance, but how do they motivate managers to 
improve the performance and value of the company for the benefit of shareholders? 
(Kang & Shivdasani, 1995). 
Heracleous (2001), argues that the reason that "best practices" in corporate 
governance have failed to fmd a clear connection between corporate governance and 
firm performance is that best practices are irrelevant and too narrow, so performance 
and the operationalization of theoretical concepts have a low validity because 
important factors have been ignored in the analysis (Heracleous, 2001). 
In countries such as the US and the UK or in the block-holder-based systems 
of Europe and Japan, the impact of corporate governance behaviour on market value 
can be minor. In contrast, firm-level governance behavior has a huge effect on market 
value in developing countries (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000). In developing 
countries, good governance is a crucial element in all economical transactions 
(Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000). In the analysis of corporate governance, if 
one wants to find the relationship between corporate governance and effective 
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performance, it is important to take into consideration the context m which 
developing and developed countries interact (Heracleous, 2001). 
VI. Conclusions of this chapter. 
A Russian study examines corporate governance and firm performance using 
the Brunswick Warburg corporate governance rankings; it finds that companies can 
improve their value through better corporate governance practices and thus reduce the 
cost of raising capital. This study demonstrates that investors should develop 
measures of governance behavior and quantify how governance behavior affects firm 
value (Black, The corporate governance behavior and market value of Russian firms, 
2001). Another empirical study in Russia finds that firms that can cut unproductive 
costs and are led capably with outside monitoring can be more competitive (Judge, 
Naoumova, & Koutzevol, 2003). 
While exammmg alternative corporate governance mechanisms to increase 
firm value among Japanese manufacturing companies, Hiraki, Inoue, Ito, Kuroki and 
Masuda (2003) use a panel data on equity ownership and bank loans of individual 
manufacturing companies from the period of 1985 to 1998; they analyze governance 
roles undertaken by a main bank, interoperate shareholding, and managerial 
ownership. They argue that the effective mechanism of corporate governance should 
improve firm performance and be reflected in the shares price; therefore, the banks 
(lenders) can influence effective governance of Japanese firm by monitoring (Hiraki, 
Inoue, Ito, Kuroki, & Masuda, 2003). 
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A Korean study exammes the relation between corporate governance 
measures and firm value in times of crisis. According to Baeka, Kangb and Park 
(2004), firms with foreign ownership concentration and higher disclosure quality 
experience a smaller reduction in share price than firms with managers' ownership 
concentration, which experience a larger reduction in share price. Also, they find that 
companies in which controlling shareholders' voting rights exceed the cash flow 
rights, as well as those that are indebted more to the main banks, have significantly 
lower returns. Consequently, during a crisis, governance practices determine firm 
value (Baeka, Kangb, & Parke, 2004). 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) have studied the relationship between s1x 
corporate governance structures (board stze, board composition, CEO duality, 
multiple directorships, shareholdings held by the top 5 major shareholders, and 
shareholdings held by directors), as well as (1) market (measured by Q-Ratio) and (2) 
accounting (measured by ROA), and found that large boards are seen as less effective 
in monitoring performance, a fact reflected in the market price. These boards can also 
increment the compensation packages; however, in the accounting return, Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) found that big boards can provide their companies with the expertise 
to enhance performance. According to their study, the non-executive directors or 
outsiders reduce the agency conflicts associated with the potential mismanagement of 
the company's resources; however, they do not have the capacity to monitor the 
board's activities due to a lack of knowledge of their responsibilities. Therefore, this 
characteristic does not necessarily reflect improvement in the firm ' s performance 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
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Bauer, Frijhns, Otten and Tourani-Rad (2008) analyze Japanese companies 
combining elements of corporate governance (board accountability, financial 
disclosure and internal controls, shareholder rights, remuneration, market for control, 
and corporate behavior) in an index, finding that well-governed firms outperform 
poorly governed companies by up to 15% a year, even after correcting for market 
risk, size, and book-to-market effect. They argue that not all elements affect corporate 
value; elements related to financial disclosure, shareholder rights and remuneration 
impact the stock price, and elements related to board accountability, market for 
control and corporate behavior do not affect the stock price (Bauer, Frijhns, Otten, & 
Tourani-Rad, 2008). 
Javed and Iqbal (2007) analyse the relationship between a firm's value as 
measured by Tobin's q; and the total corporate governance index (CGI) that they use 
is integrated by three sub-indices: board, shareholdings and ownership, and 
disclosures and transparency. In contrast to the corporate governance index used in 
the present study, the index in this study does not contain compensation policies. 
Javed and Iqbal (2007) suggest that corporate governance does matter, and their 
conclusions coincide with other research indicating that not all elements of 
governance are important; they argue that the two first sub-indices (board 
composition and shareholders) increase the company's value, and that the third sub-
index (disclosure and transparency) does not have an effect on firm performance. The 
poor productivity and the bad corporate governance in a company cannot be covered 
by disclosure standards (Javed & lbqal, 2007). 
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When one uses different ranking systems such as Standards & Poor' s index, 
the FTSE rating, and W &C, there is a discrepancy in the scores obtained from the 
same sample (companies from UK, Ireland, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and 
Sweden); in the indices where more weight is placed on disclosure, the scores are 
similar, but some countries ' results variation is higher in the sense that the institutions 
focus on measuring different indicators of the company, having different criteria 
when assigning a number to the financial indicator, board composition, etc. (Carlin, 
2009). However, the results coincide with the fact that if companies have good levels 
of disclosure and the institution rating gives a high number to that indicator, then 
there is evidence of the association between performance and corporate governance 
(Carlin, 2009). 
While analysing the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance, Donker and Zahir (2008) argue that the relationship, if any, is weak 
because the rating score is set arbitrarily. They also point out that the rating systems 
converge to a single number and this does not reflect any details, probably resulting 
in inaccurate assumptions. As well, the information is usually provided by the 
companies, so it cannot be totally reliable (Donker & Zahir, 2008). 
In this context, it is important to realize that corporate governance will remain 
the centre of many discussions; however, aspects such as the country in which the 
company operates, the political opportunities, the law and regulations must be 
considered when one is evaluating firm performance. 
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Chapter III 
DATABASE AND METHODOLOGY 
The pnmary interest of this study is the relationship between corporate 
governance and firms ' value in Canada; this chapter describes, in tum, the database 
and the methodology used in this study. 
Database 
The present examination uses the corporate governance index (CGI) 
published by the Globe and Mail's Report on Business (ROB). This data is available 
at www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/, an online investment website affiliated 
with the ROB. The data comes from the proxy circulars that Canadian companies file 
at the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC). 
Although 270 firms were initially ranked by the ROB, comparable data is 
available for only 115 firms on a consistent basis; consequently, the present study is 
based on 115 Canadian companies over six years (2005-2010), which better reflects 
the performance of a company than would using just one year. 
The Globe and Mail publishes overall corporate governance index (CGI), 
which has a maximum value of 100. This index is a compilation of corporate 
governance characteristics obtained by summing up four sub-indices: (1) Board 
composition (BC), (2) Shareholding and compensation policies (C), (3) Shareholder 
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rights policies (SR) and ( 4) Disclosure policies (D), described in the following table. 
(Tablel) 








Measures the sub-indices of board composition and 
effectiveness, compensation policies, shareholder 
rights and disclosure practices. 
Measures the autonomy, structure and effectiveness of 
directors, audit committee, compensation committee 
and nominating committee. 
Compensation Measures the insiders' access to compensation in the 
(C) form of stock options. 
Shareholders' Measures the rights of shareholders in relation to the 
rights k f h . .d (SR) stoc o t e mst ers. 
Source 
Globe and Mail, Report on 
Business (various years) 
Globe and Mail, Report on 
Business (various years) 
Globe and Mail, Report on 
Business (various years) 
Globe and Mail, Report on 
Business (various years) 
Disclosure 
(D) 
Measures company's transparency and disclosure Globe and Mail, Report on 
practices. Business (various years) 
The first sub-index is board composition; it takes in consideration the 
autonomy, structure and effectiveness of the company. Autonomy is measured by the 
percentage of the company's directors and committees (audit, compensation, 
executive pay, nominating, and recommendation of new directors of committees) that 
are independent, meaning no affiliation with the firm, the members of the firm, or any 
business related to the firm. Structure is measured by whether or not the chair and 
CEO are split, or if is there a senior director. Effectiveness is measured by 
considerations such as the relationship among directors, if the CEO is busy with 
outside commitments, if the company has a system to evaluate performance, and 
frequency of meetings (Klein, Shapiro, & Young, 2005). 
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The second sub-index is shareholding and compensation policies; it takes into 
consideration the degree of alignment between managers ' and shareholders ' interests: 
in other words, executive pay and performance. These policies measure whether or 
not the directors and CEO are required to own stock, if they own stock or shares, if 
they have their own separate option plan, and if the firm gives loans (Klein, Shapiro, 
& Young, 2005). 
The third sub-index is shareholders' rights; it takes in consideration 
employees' stock options and subordinate shares that dilute ownership and voting 
rights. These policies measure whether or not all the directors stand for re-election 
annually; if the employees ' stock options are excessively dilutive for shareholders; 
and if the firm ' s shares are non-voting or subordinate voting, among other issues 
(Klein, Shapiro, & Young, 2005). 
The fourth sub-index is disclosure policies; it takes into consideration the 
corporate governance commitment to follow the Ontario Securities Commission 
regulations. These policies measure whether the company engages in statement of 
corporate governance practices, disclosure of directors that are related and why, 
disclosure of payments that the firm has made to auditors, disclosure of biographies 
of the board members, disclosure of directors that have seats on other boards, and 
whether the firm discloses the attendance of its directors in meetings (Klein, Shapiro, 
& Young, 2005). 
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The corresponding financial data (including a number of profitability 
indicators such as return on assets, return on equity, earnings before interest and 
taxes, earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation allowance, Tobin ' s q, etc.) and 
size and leverage indictors 2005-2010 have been collected from the OSIRIS database, 
S&P Capital IQ and investing.money.msn.com. The profitability indicators are 
described in the table below. (Table 2) 
















Earnings before interest and taxes 
Earnings before interest and taxes divided by book value 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by book value 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets 
Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets 
Net income 
Return on assets 
Return on assets divided by the average of total assets 
Return on equity 
Return on equity divided by the average of total assets 
Equity market value plus liabilities book value, divided by the book value plus 
liabilities book value 
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Methodology 
In order to examme the dynamics of corporate governance and the 
relationship with performance in a sample of 115 Canadian companies for six years 
(2005-20 1 0), this study uses simple statistical tools such as descriptive statistics and 
correlation of various variables to analyze the dynamics of the relationship between 
corporate governance indicators and profitability. 
In the descriptive statistics, the performance of the company was measured 
first by the total of the corporate governance index and each one of its sub-indices; 
second by the profitability indicators such as EBIT, EBIT ABV, EBITDA, 
EBITDABV, EBITDATA, EBITTA, NI, ROA, ROA1, ROE, ROEl and Tobin ' s q; 
and third by other parameters such as BV, LTA, MV, NS, G and TA (See Table 1 for 
descriptions of variables) . 
After the analysis of the corporate governance variables, the corporate 
governance total index, the four sub-indices, the profitability indicators and other 
parameters were examined through a correlation coefficient. 
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Chapter IV 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter presents results of the empirical exercise as discussed in chapter 
III. This chapter is organized as follows: Descriptive Statistics of 115 Canadian 
companies for CGI, fmancial indicators and other parameters for the period of six 
years (2005-20 1 0), and correlation between all performance indicators of the sample 
for the same period of six years. 
Descriptive Statistics. 
The initial review of the set of data in Table 3 reveals that the mean score of 
115 Canadian companies on the CGI index is 69, with a median score of 70. The 
maximum score of this cohort of companies is as high as 98, but the variation in CGI 
is high as reflected in a standard deviation of 17. 
As far as board composition (BC), which measures the autonomy, structure 
and effectiveness of the board, goes, the average score and median score is 26. The 
maximum score in this category is 38, and the low score is 8. The standard deviation 
is 7. 
Similarly, in terms of compensation (C), the second component of CGI, which 
measures the degree of alignment between managers and shareholders interest, the 
average score, is relatively low, 16. The median is slightly higher at 17; the maximum 
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is 26, and the minimum is 1. The variation in CGI is low as reflected in a standard 
deviation of 5. 
In terms of the shareholders ' rights (SR), the third component of CGI, which 
measures employees' stock options and subordinate shares that dilute ownership and 
voting rights, the average score and median score are 20, which is relatively high. 
The maximum is 33 and the minimum 2. The variation in CGI is low as reflected in a 
standard deviation of7. 
Regarding disclosure (D), the fourth component of CGI, which measures the 
corporate governance commitment to follow the OSC regulations, the average is 7 
and the median 8, relatively low. The maximum score of this cohort is 12 and the 
deviation 3. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the sample 2005-2010 (N=115). 
Corporate governance 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
indicators deviation 
CGI 69 70 0 98 17 
BC 26 26 8 38 7 
c 16 17 1 26 5 
SR 20 20 2 33 7 
D 7 8 0 12 3 
Source: (1) Globe and Mail, Report on Business (various years). 
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The review of the set of data in Table 4 reveals that on average, each of the 
115 Canadian companies has total assets of $33 ,755,863.78, with the median size 
being $3,808,350.00, which indicates that there are large firms in the sample. The 
standard deviation is $101 ,239,084.00, also possible in high dispersion in the sample 
(and also the large size). This wide rate is also reflected in market value (market 
capitalization) of the firms . The average market value at $8,888,038.32 is far different 
from the median market value of $2,791,001.02. The average value of equity at 
$5,739,540.40 is totally different from the median value of $1,552,075.50. Similarly, 
gearing also totally varies from zero to 370.93 percent. 
Table 4. Size and Related parameters of the sample 2005-2010 (N=llS). 
Other parameters Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
Book Value (BV) 5.7 1.5 0.001 209.7 18.4 
Long-Term Assets (L T A) 5.9 2.1 61.4 9.0 ] 
~ 
Market Capitalization (MV) 8.8 2.7 -0.02 77.6 13.4 
Net Sales (NS) 5.6 2.3 37.1 7.3 
Gearing (G) 3.9 0.71 0.00037 0.000026 
Total Assets (TA) 33.7 3.8 0.019 0.000072 101.2 
Source: (1) OSIRIS database; (2) S&P Capital IQ; and (3) http://investing.money.msn.com 
A corresponding review of the financial of data in Table 5 reveals that the 
average profitability of 115 Canadian sample companies as revealed by Earnings 
before Interest and Taxes comes to $883,137, with the median well below at 
$327,300. The maximum profit of this cohort of companies is as high as $7,939,000, 
but the variation is high, as reflected in the standard deviation of$1,471,542.06. As a 
proportion of book value (EBITABV), the average is $9.39, with a median score of 
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$0.20. The maximum score of this cohort of companies is as high as $642.91 , but the 
variation is high, as reflected in a standard deviation of $57.88. 
Finally, the Tobin's q average is as high as 2.36%, and the median is 1.93%. 
The maximum score of this cohort of companies is as high as 27.54%, and the 
variation is high, as reflected in a standard deviation of 1.95%. 
Table 5. Profitability indicators of the sample 2005-2010 (N=115). 
Profitability indicators Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
deviation 
EBIT 883,137.11 327,300.00 - 6,320,000.00 7,939,000.00 1,471 ,542.06 
EBITABV 9.39 0.20 -117.31 642.91 57.88 
EBITDA 1,238,653 .07 532,235 .00 - 6,223,000.00 10,622,000.00 1,777,584.59 
EBITDABV 9.81 0.29 - 105.74 648.45 59.28 
EBITDATA 1.17 0.13 - 10.15 136.41 7.87 
EBITTA 1.09 0.08 - 11.26 135.24 7.74 
NI 523,408.20 164,891.00 - 4,274,000.00 5,633,000.00 980,417.56 
ROA 0.04 0.04 - 1.18 0.43 0.11 
ROAl 0.05 0.05 - 1.07 0.55 0.11 
ROE 0.10 0.13 -2.62 0.84 0.23 
ROEl 0.12 0.13 - 1.34 1.40 0.20 
Tobin's q 2.36 1.93 - 0.15 27.54 1.95 
Source: (1) Globe and Mail, Report on Business (various years); (2) OSIRIS database; (3) S&P 
Capital IQ; and investing.money.msn.com. 
Correlation of all performance indicators. 
Table 6 reports the correlation matrix of corporate governance variables and 
financial indicators. Using the parameters of 0.1 to 0.5 as a weak correlation and 0.6 
to 1.0 as a strong correlation, the results support a strong correlation between CGI 
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and board composition, compensation of the shareholder, and shareholder rights and 
disclosure practices in the aggregate set of the 115 Canadian companies. 
The literature supports the hypothesis that there exists an association between 
the corporate governance index and corporate performance measures. However, using 
the same parameters, it was found that the corporate governance variables (board 
composition, compensation, shareholder rights and disclosure) were not significantly 
correlated to these profitability indicators (such as Tobin q, ROA and ROE). 
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BC 0.67 
c 0.69 0.4 1 
SR 0.61 0.19 0.38 
D 0.57 0.22 0.54 0.47 
EBIT 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.28 0.24 
EBITBV -0. 13 -0.18 -0.03 -0.11 -0.12 0. 19 
EBITDA 0.26 0.06 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.95 0.13 
EBITDABV -0. 13 -0.18 -0.03 -0.11 -0.12 0.19 1.00 0.13 
EBITDATA -0.09 -0.12 0.01 -0. 11 -0.08 0. 15 0.89 0.10 0.88 
EBITTA -0.09 -0.12 0.01 -0. 11 -0.08 0.15 0.88 0.10 0.88 1.00 
Nl 0.33 0. 13 0.31 0.35 0.26 0.82 -0.08 0.76 -0.08 -0.07 -0.068 
ROA 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.0 1 0.00 0. 12 -0.02 0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.007 0.18 
ROAI 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0. 11 -0.03 0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.000 0.17 0.97 
ROE 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.25 0.09 0.20 0.09 0.09 0.089 0.30 0.85 0.81 
ROE I 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.26 0.10 0.2 1 0.10 0.10 0. 103 0.3 1 0.84 0.86 0.92 
TOBIN'S g -0.03 0.06 -0.14 0.02 -0.13 0.0 1 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.063 0.02 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.042 
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Chapter V 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
There is a growing body of international evidence supporting the existence 
of a correlation between a corporate governance structure and firm performance 
and valuation outcomes. The study examines the broad relationship between 
corporate governance variables in Canada and financial outcomes, using a cohort 
of 115 Canadian firms for the period 2005-2010. The study finds a generally weak 
correlation between corporate governance variables and financial outcomes. This 
result does not mean the corporate governance variables do not impact firm 
performance. There are several reasons that the nature of the relationship between 
corporate governance variables and firm valuation may be opposed. For example; 
firms with higher market values may choose to adopt better corporate governance 
practices. Hence one has to look at the channel through which governance 
mechanisms derive their impact. Prior studies have suggested a number of 
potential channels for corporate governance effects, such as stronger shareholder 
rights and legal protection mechanisms, which lower investor capital costs, or 
incentive effects associated with takeover vulnerability. Other suggested channels 
include greater coverage and reporting by ratings agencies, improved management 
structure and oversight through voluntary or legislative enforcement of codes of 
governance practice and enhanced disclosure in formativeness. 
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